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NOTES
Labor Law—Antitrust liability Of Labor Unions—Connell Construc-
tion Co. v. Plumbers Local 1000L As bargaining representative for
workers in the mechanical and plumbing trades industry in Dallas,
Texas, respondent, Plumbers Local 100 (the Union), had agreed to a
"most favored nation" 2 clause in a multiemployer collective bargaining
agreement with a mechanical contractor's association. Seeking to ex-
pand Union membership but disclaiming any interest in representing
workers directly employed by general construction contractors, 3 the
Union sought to execute with petitioner, Connell Construction Co.
(Connell), and several other general construction contractors in the
Dallas area, 4 agreements which stipulated that the general contractor
would subcontract mechanical work, which his employees did not per-
form, exclusively to firms which had a current collective bargaining
agreement with the Union. 2 Connell obtained jobs by competitive bid-
ding and customarily subcontracted its mechanical work on the basis
of competitive bids submitted by both union and non-union
sub-contractors. 8
Connell refused to sign the agreement. As a result, the Union
picketed one of the company's construction sites, causing work to
1 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
1 A "most favored nation" clause generally protects a favored employer's com-
petitive position by guaranteeing that more favorable terms will not be accorded
another employer, or if given, will be extended to the favored employer. Note, 19 J.
Pus. L. 399, 399 11.4 (1970). See 421 U.S. at 623.
3 42 l U.S. at 631.
At the time Connell went to trial, five additional general contractors had signed
agreements identical to the Union-Connell agreement, and the Union. was selectively
picketing others who resisted. Id, at 621.
The agreement provided:
WHEREAS, the contractor and the union are engaged in the con-
struction industry, and
WHEREAS, the contractor and the union desire to make an agree-
ment applying in the event of subcontracting in accordance with Section
8(e) of the Labor-Management Relations Act;
WHEREAS, it is understood that by this agreement the contractor
does not grant, nor does the union seek, recognition as the collective bar-
gaining representative of any employees of the signatory contractor; and
WHEREAS, it is further understood that the subcontracting limita-
tion provided herein applies only to mechanical work which the contractor
does not perform with his own employees but uniformly subcontracts to
other firms;
THEREFORE, the contractor and the union mutually agree with
respect to work falling within the scope of this agreement that is to be
done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting or repair of any
building, structure, or other works, that [if] the contractor should contract
or subcontract any of the aforesaid work falling within the normal trade
jurisdiction of the union, said contractor shall contract or subcontract such
work only to firms that are parties to an executed, current collective bar-
gaining agreement with Local Union 100 of the United Association of
Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry.
Id. at 619-20.
6 Id, at 619.
217
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
halt.' Prompted by this work stoppage, Connell filed suit in Texas
state court, 8 seeking to enjoin the picketing as a violation of the Texas
antitrust laws. 8 When the Union removed to the federal district court,
however, Connell signed the agreement under protest and amended
its complaint" to allege an illegal restraint of trade in violation of sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act." A permanent injunction was re-
quested against further picketing to coerce execution of the
agreement. 12
The district court held that the agreement was authorized by the
construction industry proviso to section 8(e) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act" (NLRA) and, therefore, was exempt from federal anti-
trust laws.' 4 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed," holding that the agreement was exempt from
the antitrust laws on several grounds. First, there was no evidence of a
conspiracy. to restrain trade between the Union and a non-labor
T Id. at 620. The mechanical subcontractor on the picketed construction site had
a current collective bargaining agreement with the Union. See Connell Constr. Co, v.
Plumbers Local 100, 483 F.2d 1154, 1157, 84 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2002 (5th Cir. 1973).
8 421 U.S. at 620.
9
 TEXAS BUSINESS AND COMMERCE CODE ANN. §§ 15.01 et seq. In a similar incident
involving the same Union, both the regional office and the General Counsel of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board had refused to issue an unfair labor practices complaint
against the Union. 483 F.2d at 1158, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2003. Although the issue appar-
ently has not been expressly adjudicated, it is generally believed that if the Regional Di-
rector and the General Counsel decline to issue a complaint, the charging party has no
further recourse. See A. Cox & D. BOK, CASES ON LABOR LAW 138 (7th ed. 1969).
'° 421 U.S. at 620.
" Id. at 621. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ...." 15
U.S.C. 1 (1970). Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ." 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1970).
" 421 U.S. at 621.
18 Section 8(e) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and
any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied,
whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain
from handling, using,•selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of
the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any
other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or
hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforci-
ble and void: Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an
agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construc-
tion industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be
done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a
building, structure, or other work ...
29 U.S.C. 158(e) (1970).
" Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 78 L.R.R.M. 3012, 3015 (N.D.
Tex. 1971). The district court also held that federal labor law preempted the Texas an-
titrust laws. Id. at 3014.
" 483 F.2d at 1175, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2017.-
218
NOTES
group.' 6 Second, the agreement furthered a legitimate union interest:
the elimination of competition based on wages, hours and working
conditions. 17
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed and HELD: The
Union's agreement with Connell was not exempt from the antitrust
laws because: (1)' the agreement imposed actual and potential direct
restraints on the business market in excess of those which would be
expected to flow naturally from the elimination of competition based
on differences in wages, hours and working conditions;" (2) the
agreement was outside the ambit of the construction industry proviso
to section 8(e) of the NLRA which the Court interpreted as authoriz-
ing secondary boycott agreements only when entered into within the
context of a collective bargaining relationship, and as "possibly" lim-
ited to common-situs relationships on particular jobsites;" and (3)
the union activitiy was not subject exclusively to either the actual
damages provision of section 303(b) of the NLRA 26
 or the injunctive
relief provision of section 10(1) of the NLRA 2 ' inasmuch as there was
no indication that Congress, in providing those remedies for persons
" Id. at 1166, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2009.
"Id. at 1166-69, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2010-11. In addition, the circuit court held that
a determination of the legality of the agreement under the terms of the construction
industry proviso to section 8(e) of the NLRA was exclusively within the jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board. Id at 1169, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2012. The court further
reasoned that the agreement's legality or illegality under section 8(e) was irrelevant
since a finding of a legitimate union interest is not controlled by the legality of a
union's activity under the NLRA. Id. at 1170, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2013. The court also held
that federal labor law preempted the Texas antitrust laws. Id. at 1175, 84 L.R.R.M. at
2017. For comments on the circuit court decision see Note, 15 B.C. IND. /lc Com. L. REV,
595 (1974); Note, 52 TEXAS L. REV, 170 (1973).
is 42l U.S. at 625.
' 9 Id. at 633. Although it is not entirely clear in the opinion, the Court appears to
have definitely, rather than "possibly" limited the reach of the construction industry
proviso to common--sous relationships on a "particular" jobsite. Compare id., with id. at
635.
" 29 U.S.C. § 187(h) (1970) provides that "Iw.lhoever shall be injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason [of] any violation of subsection (a) of this section may sue
therefor in any district court ... and shall recover the damages by him sustained ...."
Subsection (a), id. § 187(a), subjects to the damages provisions of subsection (b) secon-
dary pressures outlawed by § 8(b)(4), id. § 158(b)(4).
21 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1) (1970) provides:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair
labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(A), (B) or (C) of sec-
tion 158(b) ... or section 158(e) ... or section 158(b)(7) the prelimi-
nary investigation of such charge shall be made forthwith and given prior-
ity over all other cases except cases of like character in the office where it
is filed or to which it is referred. If, after such investigation, the officer or
regional attorney to whom the matter may be referred has reasonable
cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint should issue, he
shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any United States district court
within any district where the unfair labor practice in question has oc-
curred, is alleged to have occurred, or wherein such person resides or
transacts business for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final ad-
judication of the Board with respect to such matter.
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injured by some secondary activities, sought to preclude antitrust lia-
bility for hot cargo 22 agreements. 23
In determining whether the Union's agreement with Connell was
exempt from the antitrust laws, the Court addressed itself to three
major issues. This note will begin with an examination of the Court's
treatment of the first issue: what type of union-employer agreements
are protected by labor's antitrust exemption. It will then examine the
Court's resolution of the second major issue: whether the construction
industry proviso to section 8(e) of the NLRA was to be construed lit-
erally, reaching all subcontracting boycott agreements, or more nar-
rowly, reaching only those agreements which protected the contract-
ing union's members from having to work on multiemployer jobsites
alongside non-union laborers. Since the Court's interpretation of the
proviso is one of first impression, its likely impact on the construction
industry will be discussed. Finally, this note will examine the Court's
and dissenting Justice Stewart's resolution of the third major issue:
whether Congress intended, by providing in the NLRA damages and
injunction remedies for various kinds of secondary activity, to pre-
clude an antitrust remedy when a union violates the hot cargo pro-
scription of section 8(e).
I. ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
The first issue resolved by the Court was whether the Union-
Connell agreement was shielded from antitrust scrutiny by the general
policy of the labor laws. The Court began its analysis with the novel
assertion that labor's antitrust exemption derived from two distinct
sources: statutory and nonstatutory." The statutory exemption is de-
rived from the Norris-LaGuardia 25 and Clayton Acts." As the Court
22
 A hot cargo agreement generally provides that an employer will not conduct
business with, or handle the goods of, a non-union employer. S. REP. No, 187, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 79, reprinted in I LEGISLA'T'IVE HISTORY OF TliE LABOR•MANAGEMENT
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 475 (1959).
23 421 U.S. at 634. The Court also affirmed the circuit court's ruling that state
antitrust law was preempted since the application of state law would create a substantial
risk of conflict with federal guarantees and regulation of employee organizational ac-
tivities. Since the Union's activity in Connell was organizational, the application of Texas
antitrust law presented a substantial risk of frustrating the basic labor policy favoring
employee organization and interfering with the comprehensive NLRA scheme for reg-
ulating organizational activity. Id. at 637. Furthermore, the Court noted that it previ-
ously had held that labor law questions which are ordinarily within the original jurisdic-
tion of the National. Labor Relations Board but which are collateral issues in suits
brought under an independent federal remedy can be decided by the federal courts. Id.
at 626.
" Id. at 621-22. Connell appears to be the first case in which the Court has de-
scribed labor's antitrust exemption as deriving from nonstatutory as well as statutory
Sources.
23 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
22
 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970).
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recognized in United States v. Hutcheson, 27
 this exemption protects
specific union conduct such as secondary picketing and boycotts."
Thus, it allows a union, acting unilaterally and not in combination
with a non-labor group, to impose various restraints on competition."
On the other hand, the nonstatutory exemption, which protects
union-employer agreements, is a Court-created exemption derived
from a recognition of the need to accommodate conflicting congres-
sional policies expressed in the antitrust and labor laws. 3" While the
antitrust laws promote a freely competitive economic order, the labor
laws, by granting workers the right to associate and bargain collec-
tively over their conditions of employment, favor the elimination of
competition based on differences in wages, hours and working
conditions."
The nonstatutory exemption, representing a reconciliation of
these conflicting labor and antitrust policies, is, as the Court noted,
"limited."32
 In three major decisions, Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel
Tea Co., 33
 UMW v. Pennington," and Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3,
/BEW," the Court had haltingly delineated the scope of the exemp-
tion. In Pennington, the Court concluded that there is nothing in the
national labor policy to protect a union which agrees with the em-
ployers in one bargaining unit to impose the same wages, hours and
working conditions on another bargaining unit." Even though such
an agreement is related to the legitimate union goal of obtaining uni-
form labor standards and thereby eliminating competition based on
differences in those standards, the Court in Pennington held that a
union would not be entitled to an antitrust exemption: 37
 by agreeing
with one set of employers to impose the identical wages on other bar-
gaining units, the union was furthering an employer anticompetitive
conspiracy" and acting in contravention of its obligation to its mem-
bers to bargain on a unit-by-unit basis. 3 " Similarly, twenty years prior
to Pennington, the Court had held in Allen Bradley that if a union corn-
" 312 U.S. '219 (1941). Hutcheson outlined the statutory antitrust exemption:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-
labor groups, the licit and the illicit under [Clayton Act] * 20 are not to he
distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdorn, the
rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness or the end of
which the particular union activities are the means.
Id. at 232.
28 421 U.S. at 621.2'2, citing Hutcheson, 31.2 U.S. 219 (194 I ).
29 421 U.S. at 622.
" Id., citing Meat Cutters Local 189 v. jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S, 676 (1965).
" 421 U.S. at 622,
52 Id.
"381 U.S. 676 ( 1965).
34 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
55 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
36 381 U.S. at 666.
" Id. at 669.
as Id.
a6
	at 666.
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bines with conspiring business groups and assists in effecting a busi-
ness monopoly the union is not entitled to an antitrust exemption. 40
Thus, prior to Connell, both Pennington and Allen Bradley clearly
stood for the proposition that a union-employer agreement would not
be entitled to the nonstatutory antitrust exemption if the agreement
was the result of a conspiracy to restrain trade. However, absent a
conspiracy, the scope of the nonstatutory exemption was less clear.
In Jewel Tea, a case stripped of conspiracy overtones,"' two dis-
tinctly different tests of exemption were delineated, but neither re-
ceived the support of a majority of the Court. Justice White, in an
opinion joined by Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Warren, 42 con-
tended that a collective bargaining agreement's nonstatutory exemp-
tion turned on whether or not the subject matter of the agreement is
"intimately related" to the wages, hours or working conditions of the
bargaining unit's employees. 43 Applying this test, Justice White upheld
the challenged meat marketing hours provision since the anticompeti-
tive restraints imposed by the prohibition of retail meat sales after 6
pm went no further than was necessary to preserve existing working
conditions. 4 ' Concurring in the result, Justice Goldberg propounded a
broader test in an opinion joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart: 45 If
the subject matter of the agreement is a mandatory bargaining sub-
ject, the agreement should be accorded an exemption." Finding that
the meat marketing hours provision in fact was a mandatory bargain-
ing subject, Justice Goldberg therefore concluded that the agreement
was lawful.'" Thus, in the absence of a conspiracy, there appeared to
exist two tests for a nonstatutory exemption, since neither the Gold-
berg nor the White formulations had received support from more
than three justices.
Against this background of the nonstatutory exemption, as de-
lineated by the conspiracy bar and the non-conspiracy tests of Justices
White and Goldberg, the Connell Court reasoned that congressional
labor policy warrants an exemption for agreements which lessen busi-
ness competition based on substandard wages, hours and working
conditions." Conversely, the Court stated that no exemption is war-
ranted if an agreement restrains competition based on factors other
than substandard labor conditions."
Turning to the Union-Connell agreement, the Court held that
the agreement did not qualify for the nonstatutory exemption. The
4" 325 U.S. at 810.
4 ' 381 U.S. at 688.
"Id. at 679.
43 Id. at 689-90.
" See id. at 692-97.
45
 Id. at 697.
"Id. at 732-33.
" See id. at 735.
42I U.S. at 622.
"Id. at 622-23.
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agreement required Connell to boycott all non-Local 100 subcontrac-
tors, regardless of whether the competitive advantage of these subcon-
tractors was derived from substandard wages, hours and working
conditions, or from more efficient operating methods." The infir-
mities involved in the exclusion of all non-Local 100 subcontractors
were enhanced by the "most favored nation" clause in the Union's
multiemployer bargaining agreement with the Mechanical Contractors
Association of Dallas. The clause prescribed the exact terms the
Union could seek in bargaining with newly organized
subcontractors." Thus, as the Union expanded its membership to
new subcontractors who were forced to unionize, competition between
the subcontractors would he lessened, since all would be bound by the
same terms, due to the "most favored nation" clause. Moreover, the
lessening of competition would extend not only to wages, hours and
working conditions but also to terms in the Union's collective bargain-
ing agreement with the Association unrelated to labor conditions."
Additionally, the Court found that because the Union's agree-
ments with Connell and other general contractors provided for sub-
contracting only to Local 100 firms, the agreements gave the Union
substantial control, within its geographical jurisdiction, over contractor
access to the mechanical subcontracting market. 53 This control, if
exercised, would have had substantial anticompetitive effects which
were not the result of organizing workers and eliminating competition
based on differences in wages, hours and working conditions, but
rather the result of simply eliminating from the market subcontractors
with whom the Union chose not to dea1. 54 These actual and potential
anticompetitive effects of the Union-Connell agreement, the Court
stated, were not justified by congressional labor policy since they did
not "follow naturally" from the Union's legitimate goal of organizing
workers and eliminating competition based on differences in wages,
hours and working conditions. 55 Therefore, the Court held that the
agreement was not entitled to a nonstatutory exemption from the an-
titrust laws."
5 * Id. at 623.
" Id. at 623 & n.l.
"Id. 623-24,
55 Id. at 624.
"Id. at 624-25. Hypothesizing potential abuses of the Union's ability to control
market access, the Court stated that the Union might refuse to sign collective bargain-
ing agreements with "marginal" firms if it suited the interests of the Union's members.
Id. Since the "most favored nation" clause in the Union's agreement with the Contrac-
tors Association required the Union to seek the same terms from other subcontractors
as it had with the Association, the Court suggested that the Union could put subcon-
tractors, who were willing to bargain but unable to meet the terms contained in the
Union's agreement with the Association, out of business by insisting upon those terms.
Id. Moreover, the Court also hypothesized that .the Union might create a "geographical
enclave" for Local 100 subcontractors by refusing to deal with "travelling" subcontrac.
tors. Id. at 625.
55 Id. at 625.
511
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The Court's analytic focus on the anticompetitive effects of the
Union-Connell agreement indicates that these effects, standing alone,
were determinative of the Union's nonstatutory antitrust exemption.
There was no evidence which suggested a subjective intent on the part
of the Dallas Mechanical Contractor's Association to restrain
competition." Thus, the Court has apparently delineated a new
"natural effects" test of nonstatutory exemption which is to be applied
to union-employer agreements having no conspiracy overtones.
Moreover, this test appears to supplant the Jewel Tea tests regardless
of whether or not the agreement arises in a collective bargaining con-
text. Prior to Connell, it was clear that the nonstatutory antitrust ex-
emption, as articulated in Jewel Tea, extended to agreements made
within the collective bargaining context. The Union-Connell agree-
ment, on the other hand, arose outside of that context. Simply by in-
quiring as to whether the Union-Connell agreement was entitled to
the exemption, the Court appears to have extended the nonstatutory
exemption to all union-employer agreements regardless of the context
in which they are made. 58
 Furthermore, the Court noted in dicta that
if an agreement creating a market restraint of the magnitude created
by the Union-Connell agreement were effected within a collective
bargaining relationship it would still not be entitled to the nonstatu-
tory antitrust exemption." This comment militates against a conclu-
sion that the Court was evolving a nonstatutory exemption test limited
solely to union-employer agreements executed outside a collective
bargaining relationship. Rather, the dicta buttresses the conclusion
that the Court was attempting to provide a single test of exemption
for the courts to apply in all future antitrust-labor litigation regardless
57 Id. at 625 n.2.
s" This apparent extension of the nonstatutory exemption to union-employer
agreements executed outside the collective bargaining context implies that secondary
agreements are entitled to the exemption if their anticompetitive effects are the result
of eliminating competition based on substandard labor conditions. Thus, if the Union-
Connell agreement had provided merely that Connell would subcontract mechanical
work only to firms whose employees were accorded the same wages, hours and working
conditions to which the Union and Local 100 subcontractors had agreed, the Union-
Connell areement would not have been subject to any of the anti-competitive infirmities
which the Court found in the executed agreement. Rather, the agreement essentially
would have constituted a secondary union standards agreement. However, since such
an agreement would involve-a neutral employer in a union's controversy with another
employer, it would directly contravene the labor policy expressed in §§ 8(b)(4) and 8(e)
of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(h)(4), (e) (1970), which generally seek to curb a union's
power to involve neutral employers in its labor disputes. Thus, unless the Court meant
that this type of secondary boycott agreement would be entitled to the nonstatutory ex-
emption but would be capable of being redressed under the NLRA, the apparent ex-
tension of the nonstatutory exemption to union-employer agreements entered into out-
side a collective bargaining context may indicate a judicial determination that the con-
gressional labor policy favoring the elimination of competition based on substandard
labor conditions displaces the NLRA's policy against secondary boycotts when the sub-
standard conditions are elimiAated by means of a secondary boycott agreement.
" 421 U.S. at 625-26.
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of the context in which the agreement is concluded.
Nonetheless, the Court does not appear to have strayed far. In
delineating this new test, and thereby removing the uncertainty sur-
rounding the exemption test created by the lack of a Court consensus
in Jewel Tea, the Court appears to have adopted a mode of analysis
closely paralleling Justice White's Jewel Tea test,"" which exempted
those union-employer agreements "intimately related" to wages, hours
and working conditions. The "intimately related" test involved a judic-
ial determination that if an agreement goes further than necessary to
protect a legitimate union interest and creates additional restraints on
competition, the union's interest does not outweigh the public's in-
terest in free competition."' The "natural effects" test of Connell im-
plies the same determination. If the anticompetitive effects of the
agreement are the result of eliminating competition based only on dif-
ferences in wages, hours and working conditions, an exemption is
appropriate." 2 However, if the agreement goes further than necessary
to eliminate competition based on substandard labor conditions, and
instead directly restrains other areas of competition, its anticompeti-
tive effects are not a natural consequence of legitimate union interests
and the union is not, therefore, entitled to the nonstatutory antitrust
exemption."
The "natural effects" test also appears to consider "potential" as
Well as "actual" anticompetitive effects." In Connell, the record con-
tained no facts indicating that the Union might utilize its power to
control market access." However, the Court only considered whether
the Union-Connell agreement was entitled to the nonstatutory antitrust
exemption and not whether the agreement in fact unreasonably re-
strained competition and thereby violated the Sherman Act."
Whether potential anticompetitive effects mature into actual violations
of the Sherman Act is a separate issue, distinct from the labor law
considerations defining the nonstatutory antitrust exemption. The
Court's intent seems clear; a union-employer agreement is not entitled
"" 381 U.S. at 689-90.
"' In Jewel Tea, Justice White examined the meat marketing hours provision to
determine if the union's interest in its members' working hours was in fact protected by
the provision. Id. at 694-97. According to Justice White, the validity of the provi-
sion turned on whether the union's goal of limiting butchers' hours could be effected
without it. Id at 694. The inference which can be drawn from this mode of analysis is
that if the provision imposed anticompetitive restraints in excess of those necessary to
protect the union's interests, it, like the agreement in Connell, would not have been ex-
empted from the antitrust laws. See also American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391
U.S. 99, 117 (1968) (White, J., dissenting).
" 2 See 421 U.S..at 625.
"3 See id.
64 See id. at 623-25.
65 Id. at 624-25.
"6 Since neither the district nor the circuit court had considered whether the
agreement actually restrained trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act, and since
the issue was not fully briefed or argued before the Court, the case was remanded for a
finding of whether the agreement violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 637.
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to the nonstatutory exemption if it has potential anticompetitive effects
unrelated to legitimate union interests.
11. SECTION 8(e)
The second major issue addressed by the Court was whether the
agreement was specifically authorized by the construction industry
proviso to section 8(e) of the NLRA and was, therefore, exempt from
the antitrust laws.67
 Section 8(e) generally prohibits agreements be-
tween a union and a neutral secondary employer under the terms of
which the neutral employer agrees not to do business with, or deal in
the goods of, a primary employer with whom the union has a labor
dispute." However, the proviso to section 8(e) provides that "an
agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the con-
struction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of
work to be done at the site of the construction ... of a building ..." is
exempt from 8(e)'s general proscription of secondary objective (hot
cargo) agreements."
The Union-Connell agreement appeared to be included within
the literal language of the proviso. However, the Court rejected the
literal language approach, choosing instead to interpret the proviso
narrowly in light of its legislative history. Determining that Congress
never intended to authorize agreements such as that between the
Union and Connell, the Court concluded that the agreement was not
authorized by the proviso."
In concluding that the proviso should be narrowly construed,
the Court first reasoned that, in contrast to the full exemption given
employees in the garment industry proviso to section 8(e)," the ex-
emption created by the construction industry proviso was far more
limited. 72
 Congressional debates and reports which dealt with the
garment industry proviso, unlike those dealing with the construction
industry proviso, indicated a clear congressional intent to allow gar-
ment industry workers to use subcontracting agreements broadly for
67 1d. at 626.
68 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970). See note 9 supra.
"Id.
'° 421 U.S. at 627-28.
71
 The garment industry proviso to § 8(e) provides:
That for the purposes of this subsection and subsection (b) of this section
the terms "any employer", "any person engaged in commerce or any in-
dustry affecting commerce", and "any person" when used in relation to
the terms "any other producer, processor, or manufacturer", "any other
employer", or "any other person" shall not include persons in the relation
of a jobber, manufacturer, contractor, or subcontractor working on the
goods or premises of the jobber or manufacturer or performing parts of
an integrated process of production in the apparel and clothing industry
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970). For a discussion of the garment industry exemptions see
Danielson v. Joint Bd., ILGWU, 494 F.2d 1230, 1233-39 (2d Cir. 1974) (Friendly, J.).
78
 421 U.S. at 630.
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organizational purposes." With regard to the construction industry
proviso, however, the Court perceived a narrower congressional in-
tent This perception was based on Congress' sketchy references" in
1959 to the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Denver Building &
Construction Trades Council," and Congress' subsequent failure, largely
for procedural reasons, 76 to legislatively overrule that case and permit
picketing of a neutral general contractor to force him to cease doing
business with a non-union subcontractor. According to the Court, the
congressional concern with friction between union and non-union
employees on a multiemployer construction site culminated in the ex-
press use of the words "site of the construction ... or other work" in
the proviso itself. 77 Thus, Congress indicated a desire to limit the pro-
viso to subcontracting agreements designed to alleviate the problems
attending the close juxtaposition of interests on a multiemployer con-
struction site: specifically, the problems of friction and work stoppages
73 /d. at 633 & n.13.
" Senator Kennedy, in his report on the Conference agreement, stated:
The first proviso ... is intended to preserve the present state of the
law with respect to picketing at the site of a construction project and with
respect to the validity of agreements relating to the contracting of' work to
be done at the site of a construction project.
This proviso affects only section 8(e) and therefore leaves unaf-
fected the law developed under section 8(b) (4). The Denver Building Trades
(341 U.S. 675) and the Moore Drydock (92 N.L.R.B. 547) cases would re-
main in force.
Agreements by which a contractor in the construction industry
promises not to subcontract work on a construction site to a nonunion con-
tractor appear to be legal today. They will not he unlawful under section
8(e). The proviso is also applicable to all other agreements involving un-
dertakings not to do work on a construction project site with other con-
tractors or subcontractors regardless of the precise relation between them.
Since the proviso does not relate to section 8(b)(4), strikes and picketing to
enforce the contracts excepted by the proviso will continue to he illegal
under section S(b)(4) whenever the Sand Door case (357 U.S. 93) is applica-
ble.
It is not intended to change the law with respect to the judicial en-
forcement of these contracts, or with respect to the legality of a strike to
obtain such a contract.
105 CONC.. REC. 17900 (1959) (remarks of Senator Kennedy). Senator Kennedy's re-
marks are reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE H isToRY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING
AND DISCLOSURE AC- 1 - OF 1959, at 1433 (1959).
In an analysis of the Landrum-Griffin legislation, which enacted § 8(e), Rep-
resentatives Thompson and Udall stated:
Where all the men are employed on the same project, the division
into different trades or crafts, each with its own employer, must not be al-
lowed to obscure their common interests—they work side by side and the
wages and working conditions of one trade affect all the others.
105 CoNc, REG, 1554 (1959). This memorandum is reprinted in 2 LEasidyrivt: HISTORY
OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE Act' OF 1959, at 1577 (1959).
These statements represent the extent of the 1959 congressional discussion of the
implications of the construction industry proviso,
75 341 U.S. 675 (1951),
421 U.S. at 629 n.8.
" See id. at 629-30.
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which result from the presence of a non-union subcontractor on a
multiemployer jobsite.'g
Second, the Court reasoned that to interpret the proviso to
allow construction industry unions to seek subcontracting agreements
from contractors with whom they did not have a collective bargaining
relationship was contrary to one of the major purposes of the 1959
amendments: the placing of restrictions on "top-down" organizing
campaigns. 79
 To authorize such tactics under the construction indus-
try proviso would undermine the restrictions placed on organizing by
sections 8(b)(7) 8° and 8(b)(4)(B) 8 ' of the NLRA. 82
Examining the Union-Connell agreement in light of this strict in-
terpretation, the Court found that it was unrelated to protecting
either Connell's employees or Local 100's members from having to
work on a multiemployer jobsite alongside non-union laborers. 83
Rather, the agreement placed restrictions only on the subcontracting
of mechanical work and thus clearly left open the possibility of Connell
subcontracting other jobsite work to non-union firms." Indeed, the
Union itself admitted that the Connell agreement was a sword to aid
in its organizational efforts rather than a shield to protect its members
from common-situs employment with non-union construction
78 See id. at 629-31.
78 id. at 632-33. In a "top-down" organization campaign, a union uses its
economic weapons, pickets and boycotts, to compel an employer to unionize. Conse-
quently, the employer's employees are deprived of a free choice of bargaining agent
and, indeed, of their right to decide if they wish to join a union. See id. at 632.
80 29 U.S.C. § 158(6)(7) (1970). Section 8(6)(7) regulates in detail the recogni-
tional picketing in which unions may engage.
8 ' Section 8(b)(4) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for a union
(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to en-
gage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, man-
ufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an in-
dustry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is—
(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to
join any labor or employer organization or to enter into any agreement
which is prohibited by subsection (e) of this section;
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other per-
son, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain
with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless
such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such
employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title: Provided, That
nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful,
where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing
29	 § 158(b)(4) (1970).
82 421 U.S. at 632.
" Id. at 631.
84 id.
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workers." As such, it clearly fell outside the scope of the construction
industry proviso to section 8(e). 86
While the Court seems correct. in its conclusion that the Connell
agreement is outside the scope of the section 8(e) proviso, the general
rule which it enunciated for determining the scope of the proviso
seems poorly crafted to effectuate the underlying congressional policy.
The Court stated that the construction industry proviso authorizes
subcontracting agreements only in the context of a collective bargain-
ing relationship and is "possibly" limited to common-situs relation-
ships on a "particular" jobsite. 87 By limiting the proviso to agreements
executed , within a collective bargaining relationship, the Court has in
many cases prevented full realization of the congressional purpose
which it attributed to the proviso. It is not uncommon for a general
contractor to subcontract an entire job and thus not directly employ
any laborers of its own." Therefore, if all of the subcontractors are
not unionized, the employees of unionized subcontractors will be
forced to work side-by-side with the employees of non-union subcon-
tractors, since Connell prohibits their obtaining a hot cargo agreement
from the general contractor with whom they do not have a collective
bargaining relationship. The employees' only recourse, it. appears,
would be to execute a hot cargo agreement with their subcontracting
employer to the effect that the employer will not accept work on proj-
ects which are not all union.""
Depending on the degree of area unionization, however, a
subcontractor's agreement to this type of restriction could seriously af-
fect his ability to secure contracts, and hence his ultimate economic
survival." Moreover, if a union subcontractor stands to lose a contract
due to such an agreement, it follows that union employment will suf-
fer. By executing a hot cargo agreement with a subcontractor, the
union, therefore, would effectively jeopardize employment oppor-
tunities for its members. Clearly such a result would be contrary to
the union's interest.
It is submitted, therefore, that the Court in Connell incorrectly
limited the construction industry proviso to collective bargaining rela-
tionships. The evil which the Court sought to prevent was the use of
fl 6 1(I.
 Id. at 635.
87 Id. at 633.
W. FIntoor, lts'nusTarm, RE.1,ATIONS IN Ttil:BWI.OING 1NnUSTRY 57 (1930).
" This type of agreement was approved by the National Labor Relations Board
in Plumbers Local 217, 152 N.L.R.B. 1672, 1677, 59 L.R.R.M. 1371, 1373 (1965). The
specific agreement was disapproved, however, because the construction industry proviso
was not intended to protect self-enforcing hot cargo agreements. Id., 59 L.R.R.M. at
1373-74.
9° The subcontracting agreement in Plumbers Local 217, 152 N.L.R.B. 1672, 59
L.R.R.M. 1371 (1965), was challenged by the employer who had signed the agreement,
evidently because it prevented him from performing profitable subcontracting work. Id.
at 1673, 1674, 59 L.R.R.M. at 1372.
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the proviso as a weapon to force unionization with a specific union.9 '
This evil could have been prevented merely by requiring that there be
a nexus between the executed agreement and the purpose behind the
proviso—the elimination of problems which attend a multiemployer
jobsite. Under this standard, the agreement in Connell would have
been permissible only if it had related to jobsites at which the Union's
members were to be employed and only if it had provided generally
that union labor, whether or not affiliated with Local 100, was to
work alongside Local 100's members. Such an interpretation of the
proviso would give full effect to the congressional purpose while at
the same time prevent the use of subcontracting agreements as a
weapon designed to advance the interests of a specific union in ex-
panding its membership.
A second problem with the Court's interpretation arises where
the general contractor does have employees with whom he has an es-
tablished collective bargaining relationship. In such cases, the Court's
test fails to prohibit use of the collective bargaining agreement as an
organizational weapon. If an agreement between a general contractor
and his unionized employees specified not only that the employees
would not be required to work on jobsites with non-union workers but
also that only firms whose employees were members of particular
unions would receive subcontracting jobs, the agreement would fall
within the proviso's ambit since it meets the criteria set forth by the
Court—execution within a collective bargaining relationship and lim-
ited to a common-situs relationship on a particular jobsite. 92 Yet, a
provision of this nature would enable the general contractor's em-
ployees to blacklist a specific subcontracting employer or group of
employers whose workers were non-union. Moreover, the provision
could be used to aid the named subcontractor's employees in their or-
ganizational campaigns. For example, Local 100 of the Plumbers
Union, which did not have a collective bargaining relationship with
General Contractor X, might persuade a friendly union which did
have a collective bargaining relationship with that contractor to in-
clude in its subcontracting agreement a provision that the contractor
would subcontract plumbing work only to firms whose employees
were represented by Local 100. This result would be contrary to the
Court's statement in Connell that the section 8(e) proviso does not tol-
erate the use of subcontracting agreements as organizational weapons
for specific unions. 93
Therefore, by limiting the proviso to all subcontracting agree-
ments executed within a collective bargaining relationship and re-
stricted to common-situs relationships on a particular jobsite, 94 rather
than simply requiring a nexus between the executed agreement and
" 421 U.S. at 633.
as
3 1d. at 633.
Id. at 635.
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the proviso's purpose, the Court has placed an interpretation on the
proviso which is on the one hand underinclusive of the type of con-
duct which Congress intended to legalize and on the other hand
overpermissive of the type of conduct which Congress did not intend
the proviso to authorize. It is submitted, therefore, that the Court
should have concluded that a subcontracting agreement falls within
the proviso's ambit if it is designed to protect the members of the con-
tracting union from having to work alongside non-union laborers
without advancing at the same time the interest of a particular union
in expanding its organization.
Additional problems arise from the Court's limitation of the
scope of 8(e) subcontracting agreements. In concluding its general in-
terpretation of the proviso, the Court stated that it authorized only
agreements made within the collective bargaining context and
"possibly" restricted to common-situs relationships on a "particular"
jobsite." It is unclear from Connell whether a jobsite restriction is
necessary if a collective bargaining relationship exists, or if a jobsite
restriction alone would be dispositive of the proviso issue. Moreover,
it is unclear what the Court meant by a "particular" jobsite. By limit-
ing hot cargo agreements to collective bargaining relationships, the
Court may have intended that "particular" refer to any jobsites on
which the general contractor's union employees work. This meaning
would be consistent with the purposes attributed to such agreements:
the elimination of problems which arise when union and non-union
employees work side-by-side." Any broader interpretation, not lim-
ited to jobsites on which the general contractor's employees work,
would be outside the ambit of the construction industry proviso since
there would be no assurance of a relationship between the proviso's
purpose and the executed agreement. Thus, at a minimum, the Court
must have intended that "particular" refer to any jobsite on which the
general contractor's union employees work.
The Court may have also intended a narrower interpretation of
"particular" which would limit agreements to a named jobsite. If the
Court intended such an interpretation it could mean that a single,
general agreement between a union and a contractor covering all jobs
on which the contractor's union employees were to be utilized would
be invalid. Indeed, the union would be required to negotiate a new
hot cargo agreement for each jobsite to which the contractor's em-
ployees were assigned. Such a requirement would be unduly burden-
some in light of the actualities of construction industry employment.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the section 8(e) proviso
in Connell will have a swift and sharp impact on the construction in-
dustry. Unlike the manufacturing industry, where the employer and
employees generally have a permanent employment relationship, em-
ployment in the construction industry fluctuates seasonally and in re-
95 Id. at 633.
95 Id. at 630-31.
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sponse to the general economy's upswings and downswings." Thus,
general contractors and subcontractors, unless exceptionally large,
maintain only a skeletal working force consisting of a few supervisory
personnel. 98 Work forces are expanded as contracts are awarded.
Therefore, a single laborer may be employed by a number of differ-
ent employers during any one given year, and the length of employ-
ment will vary with the particular job and climatic conditions.
The traditional refusal of construction union members to work
on the same jobsite as non-union laborers is a direct response to these
unemployment uncertainties in the industry. The object of this refusal
is twofold: to prevent the hiring of a non-union contractor and to
force him to unionize. 99 Typically in the industry, a building contract
will be awarded to a general contractor who, in turn, will subcontract
all or a major portion of the work to contractors specializing in vari-
ous crafts.'" Thus, since it is the general contractor who controls the
award of subcontracts, if the union is to accomplish its goal of provid-
ing employment at union wage rates for its members, the general con-
tractor and not the subcontractor must be the target of the union's
efforts.' U 1
NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Couneill" frus-
trated these efforts by barring a union's picketing of a neutral general
contractor to force him to cease doing business with a non-union
subcontractor.'" However, the unions circumvented this decision by
executing subcontracting agreements with general contractors.'" His-
torically, Building and Construction Trades Councils, which take into
affiliation all crafts engaged in the industry, have entered into con-
tracts with general contractors or their associations, establishing con-
tract rights for their crafts.
These agreements are not intended to require recognition
of the Council nor are they intended to encompass bargain-
ing on wages, hours and working conditions of employees
employed by the signatory contractors. The single purpose
behind these agreements is to provide an orderly proce-
dure for the contracting and subcontracting of work by
these signatory contractors on a basis that is fair to work-
men in all of the building and construction trades crafts, as
well as to the contractor's competitors. ... [T]he policy of
" HABER, supra note 88 at 95.
" Id. at 57.
99 Note, 100 U. PA. L. Rev. 141, 143 (1951).
1 " u HABER, Slipra note 88, at 57.
1 °' Recognitional picketing of subcontractors, who generally hire only a small
number of laborers, is frustrated by the relative ease with which the subcontractor can
hire workers who are willing to cross picket lines. See Local 501, IBEW v. NLRB, 181
F.2d 34, 41, 25 L.R.R.M. 2449, 2455 (2d Cir. 1950) (dissenting opinion).
"' 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
103 Id. at 688-89.
104 See, e.g., Teamsters Local 47 (Texas Indus., Inc.), 112 N.L.R.B. 923, 924, 36
L.R.R.M. 1117, 1118 (1955).
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the building trades unions, through their affiliation with
the Council, and the execution by the Council of these
agreements with various contractors is to place on the general
contractor the obligation of dealing only with subcontractors who
have executed current working agreements with appropriate craft
unions having jurisdiction of the work performed by their
employees. These subcontractor-oriented agreements never
were and are not now intended to deal with the general
contractor's relations with his own employees. Rather, they
are intended only to deal with his contracting and subcon-
tracting of work and thereby his relations with other em-
ployers in the building and construction industry. This is
the typical situation or procedure of building and construc-
tion trades unions throughout the country."15
By confining the construction industry proviso to agreements made
within the collective bargaining context and restricted to particular
jobsites, Connell has, in addition to frustrating congressional purpose,
effectively prevented the Councils from executing subcontracting
agreements. in Los Angeles alone, at the time Connell went to trial,
the Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council had exe-
cuted 9,722 agreements similar to the one contested in Connell.'" Un-
less Congress never intended that Building and Trades Councils as-
sume the role they have in the industry, Congress will have to ex-
pressly define, once again, the area of authorized secondary activity in
the construction industry.
III. ANTITRUST REMEDIES FOR SECTION 8(e) VIOLATIONS AFTER
CONNELL
The third major issue addressed by the Court in Connell was
whether Congress, by providing damage and injunction remedies in
the NLRA for unfair labor practices, intended to foreclose an anti-
trust remedy where a union and an employer enter into a proscribed
hot cargo agreement. Because the Union-Connell agreement was out-
side the purview of the construction industry proviso, it constituted an
unfair labor practice under section 8(e): 117 secondary activity enlisting
a neutral employer's aid in an organizational campaign. Moreover, the
Union's picketing to obtain the unlawful agreement was also an unfair
labor practice under section 8(b) (4) (A) of the NLRA.'° 5 These unfair
labor practices may be remedied under sections I OUP" and 303 10 of
'" Lane-Coos-Curry-Douglas Counties Bldg. & Constr, Trades Council v. NLRB,
415 F.2d 656, 661, 72 L.R.R.M. 2149, 2153 (9th Cir. 1969) (dissenting opinion).
1 °6
 Brief for Petitioner at 28 n.6, Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421
U.S. 616 (1975).
'" 421 U.S.at 635.
1 " 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1970). See note 81 supra.
'°° Id. § 160(1). See note 21 supra.
10 1d. § 187. See note 20 supra.
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the NLRA. Section 10(1) expressly provides for injunctive relief, at
the behest of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board), for sec-
tion 8(e) or section 8(b)(4) unfair labor practices."' Section 303 ex-
pressly provides for actual damages, but only for section 8(b)(4) unfair
labor practices. 12 In the case of a purely voluntary agreement (un-
coerced by section 8(b)(4) pressures) which violates section 8(e), the
NLRA provides no damages. 13
Congress enacted section 8(b)(4) in 1947 to proscribe unilateral
secondary union activity." 4 At the same time, Congress rejected an at-
tempt to remove the antitrust exemption which this activity enjoyed
under the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts.'" Instead, it provided
the actual damages remedy under section 303 of the NLRA." 6 The
Connell Court rejected the Union's argument that this legislative his-
tory was relevant to a determination of the remedy available for a vio-
lation of the proscription of hot cargo agreements in section 8(e),'"
enacted in 1959 as part of the Landrum-Griffin A mendments." 6
Rather, the Court viewed the congressional rejection of antitrust rem-
edies in 1947 as significant only insofar as it bore on the choice of
remedies available when a union, acting alone, engages in illegal sec-
ondary activities.'" Thus, the Court appears to have drawn a line be-
tween unilateral secondary union activity proscribed by section 8(b)(4)
and union-employer hot cargo agreements proscribed by section 8(e).
This line traces that drawn by the Court between the statutory and
nonstatutory antitrust exemptions.' 2"
Focusing solely on section 8(e), the Court found nothing in the
legislative history of the Landrum-Griffin Amendments to suggest
that Congress intended that agreements entered into in violation of
section 8(e) were to be redressed exclusively under the NLRA. 121 Un-
fortunately, the Court failed to reconcile this viewpoint with Congress'
express amendment of section 10(/) to provide Board injunctive relief
for 8(e) violations.'" It is at least arguable that Congress' creation of
an injunctive remedy was to he the sole recourse for a party injured
by an uncoerced hot cargo agreement. Ignoring this possible interpre-
tation of the legislative history, the Court appears to have based its
conclusion on two factors. First, Congress did not expressly amend
section 303 to provide a damage remedy for 8(e) violations.'" Second,
1 " Id. 160(/). See note 21 supra.
"I Id. § 187. See note 20 supra.
"3 421 U.S. at 649 n.9 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
" 4 421 U.S. at 634.
13 Id. at 634 & n.15.
"6 Id.
17 1d. at 634.
"8 Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519.
"a See 421 U.S. at 634.
"See id. at 621-22.
' 21 Id. at 634.
" See 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970). See note 21 supra.
I2  421 U.S. at 634 n.16.
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Congress in 1959 rejected proposals by Representatives Hiestand and
Alger which not only would have subjected the concerted action of
two or more labor unions to the antitrust laws but also would have
subjected any arrangement between a union and employer, whether
voluntary or coerced, to the antitrust laws if it resulted in "restrictive
trade practices."'" The Court reasoned, however, that the rejection of
an antitrust remedy in these circumstances did not indicate an intent
either to extend labor's antitrust immunity to union-employer agree-
ments or to displace whatever union-employer liability might exist
tinder the antitrust laws: "That the Congress rejected these extrava-
gant proposals hardly furnishes proof that it intended to extend
labor's antitrust immunity to include agreements with non-labor par-
ties, or that it thought antitrust liability under the existing statutes
would be inconsistent with the NLRA."' 25 Thus, in concluding that an
antitrust remedy was not inconsistent with the NLRA remedial
scheme, the Court's reasoning appears to be based simply on a failure
to find a congressional intent that the Sherman Act be displaced by
the NLRA.' 21'
Joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, Justice
Stewart dissented 127 because he found :a contrary congressional intent
expressed in the legislative histories of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act 12 H
and the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Amendments. Looking first at the
1947 legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act, Justice Stewart found
that Congress had deliberately foreclosed antitrust remedies for sec-
ondary labor activities which were proscribed by section 8(b)(4)' 29 and
which previously, in the absence of a union-employer conspiracy, had
been protected from the antitrust laws by the Norris-LaGuardia
124 Id.; see 105 CoNG. Rix.. 12137 (remarks of Rep. Alger), reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT or
1959, at 1508 (1959).
"5
 421 U.S. at 634 n.16. The Supreme Court has strongly disfavored repeals of
the antitrust laws by implication, and has found a repeal only where there is a "plain
repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions." United States v. Philadel-
phia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 & n.28 (1963), citing Allen Bradley Co. v. Local
3, 1BEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945). in determining if there is a repugnancy, the courts will
look at the specific language of the statute and any legislative history which might re-
veal an express congressional intent. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 935
(D.C. Cir. 1971). The 1959 legislative history did not evidence an express congressional
intent to immunize illegal hot cargo agreements from the antitrust laws. Connell, 421
U.S. at 634.
"5
 The Court did not go beyond the express congressional intent to determine
whether the antitrust laws' operation was, in fact, repugnant to the regulatory scheme
of the NLRA. See generally Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
' 57
 421 U.S. at 638-55 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart did not find it
necessary to decide it' the Union-Connell agreement was authorized by the construction
industry proviso since in his view an antitrust remedy was precluded whether or not the
agreement was authorized. Id, at 648 n.8.
145 29 U.S.C. § 141 el seq.
14" 29 U.S.C. § 158(6)(4) (1970). See note 81 supra.
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Act.' 3" This 1947 legislative history was deemed pertinent by Justice
Stewart because he regarded the subsequent 1959 legislation, dealing
with union secondary activity, merely as closing "technical loopholes"
in the secondary activities proscribed by the 1947 legislation."' Thus,
he implied that the enactment of section 8(e) in 1959 was intended
merely to prevent unions from circumventing the secondary boycott
proscriptions of section 8(h)(4) by effecting a secondary boycott
through execution of a coerced hot cargo agreement. Furthermore,
he noted that Congress had also broadened the scope of sections
8(b)(4) and 303 in 1959 to make picketing of an employer, for the
purpose of entering into a hot cargo agreement proscribed by section
8(e), an unfair labor practice for which damages were recoverable
under section 303. 132
 "Congress ... provided an employer like Con-
nell with a fully effective private damages remedy [under the NLRA]
for the allegedly unlawful union conduct involved in this case."'"
Moreover, where the union and the employer entered into a
voluntary proscribed hot cargo agreement, an injured party could ob-
tain injunctive relief under section 10(/)." 4 Justice Stewart did ac-
knowledge, however, that an injured party might also have a valid an-
titrust claim on the grounds that, as in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3,
IBEW, 135
 the union and the employer had conspired to restrain
t rade.' 36
Turning to the 1959 legislative history, he found that Congress
again had evidenced its intent to exclude antitrust remedies for illegal
secondary activities.' 37
 He noted, as had the Court, the rejection of
the strong labor antitrust legislation proposed by Representatives
Hiestancl and Alger. 13" Justice Stewart further noted, however, that
Representative Griffin, an author of the 1959 Landrum-Griffin legis-
lation, had characterized the Amendments as a minimum bill without
an antitrust provision and had stated that he would oppose any at-
'" 421 U.S. at 640, 645 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart noted that the
Senate had rejected an attempt to include a provision in the Taft-Hartley Act which
would have made secondary union activity subject to the antitrust laws. Instead, the
Senate adopted a compromise damage provision which its author, Senator Taft, de-
scribed as providing only actual damages in lieu of the treble damages available under
the Sherman Act. Furthermore, Justice Stewart noted that in Conference a provision
similar to the one rejected in the Senate was eliminated by the House members, who
adopted instead the Taft compromise. Id. at 643-45.
' 31 1d. at 646.
1" Id. at 646-47.
'" Id. at 647.
1" See id. at 649 n.9. A signatory to such an agreement would be protected from
any damages since section 8(e) provides that a proscribed agreement is "unenforcible
and void." Id., quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970).
'" 325 U.S. 799 (1945).
'" 421 U.S. at 649 n.9 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
' 7 id. at 650.
'" Id. at 650.53; see 105 CONG. REC. 1'2135, 12136-37, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY Or THE LAROR•MANAGESIENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE AG1' Or 1959, at
1507-08 (1959).
236
NOTES
tempt to include an antitrust provision, since it would upset the
legislation's delicate balance.'" Thus, , Justice Stewart concluded that
the 1997 and 1959 legislative histories clearly indicated that Congress
did not intend to return to the pre -Huicheson' 4 ' )
 era when the courts
had held that secondary activity such as the Union had engaged in
was subject to the antitrust laws. 141
A major clifkrence between the majority and the dissent appears
to be the manner in which each treated the union antitrust liability
proposals which Congress rejected in 1959. A rejection of those pro-
posals did not signify to the Court that Congress had intended to ex-
tend liability to union-employer agreements or to displace liability
which might exist under the antitrust laws. Instead, the congressional
inaction left undisturbed whatever antitrust liability existed in 1969.' 42
The Court, perhaps applying its statutory/nonstatutory distinction re-
troactively, concluded that in 1959 , a hot cargo agreement trans-
gressed the antitrust laws while section 8(b)(4) secondary pressures
alone might be exempt.' 4" To Justice. Stewart, on the other hand, the
rejection meant a continuation of the status quo as it existed at the
time of the 1947 legislation,' 44
 when Congress had clearly rejected an-
titrust liability for a union's secondary pressures."' The 1959
Amendments, having a neutral antitrust effect, did not disturb the
exemption for secondary activities, which Congress in 1947 had
clearly intended.'"
At the time of the 1959 Amendments, it was clear that a hot
cargo agreement entered into by a union and several employers in
furtherance of a business conspiracy to restrain trade was subject to
antitrust liability. In Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW,'" the union
had entered into voluntary industrywide "understandings" with elec-
trical equipment manufacturers and contractors by which non-union
contractors and manufacturers were boycotted and equipment man-
ufactured by employers who did not employ the union's members
was barred from the market."' The Court found that the "under-
standings" were not protected from the antitrust laws by labor policy,
since there was no congressional intent to immunize a labor union
which conspires with employers to monopolize the business market.'"
Thus, Justice Stewart's acknowledgement that a non-coerced agree-
ment could be remedied under , the antitrust laws if an Allen Bradley
1 " 421 U.S. at 652 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see 105 CONC. REC. 15535, reprinted
in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 01: THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING ANI1 DISCLOSURE ACT
OF 1959, at 1571-72 (1959).
'" United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
141 421 U.S. at 654-55 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"2
 421 U.S. at 634 n.16.
1 " Id. at 634.
14
 Id. at 650 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
I " See id. at 645-97.
'" Id.
"T 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
' 4 " Id. at 799-800.
'" Id. at 809-10.
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conspiracy was prover-0" was consistent with prior case law. Likewise,
the Court's more general reasoning that immunity was not extened or
liability displaced'" would encompass an Allen Bradley situation.
It was less clear at the time of the 1959 Amendments, however,
whether, in the absence of an Allen Bradley type conspiracy, a coerced
hot cargo agreement could be the basis for an antitrust suit. Hunt v.
Crumboch,'" the companion case to Allen Bradley, appeared to indicate
that coerced hot cargo agreements, in the absence of a conspiracy,
were exempt from the antitrust laws. In Hunt, after a strike, the Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company (A & P) had entered into a closed
shop agreement with the union which provided that the A & P would
not contract to non-union haulers.'" Subsequently, the union entered
into a similar agreement with another company.'" When the union
refused to negotiate with the petitioning freight carrier, or to admit
any of its employees to union membership, the employers, at the
union's instigation and pursuant to the closed shop agreements, can-
celled their contracts with the freight hauler.'" Consequently, the
freight hauler was put out of business.'" Since there was no showing
of an Allen Bradley type conspiracy by the freight hauler's competitors
to put the petitioner out of business, the Hunt Court held that the
union's activities in refusing to deal with the freight hauler were not a vio-
lation of the antitrust laws: "The only combination ... was one of
workers alone and what they refused to sell ... was their labor."'"
The Court did not address itself to the possibility that in the absence
of a conspiracy the closed shop agreement, evidently indistinguishable
from a secondary boycott agreement, violated the antitrust laws.
Nevertheless, it is at least arguable that the Court assumed that such
agreements were as exempt from the antitrust laws as the union coer-
cion which led to their execution.' 58 Indeed, Justice Stewart appears
to have relied directly on this interpretation of Hunt'" as support for
his contention that coerced hot cargo agreements were exempt from
the antitrust laws at the time of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments.
Rejection of the Hiestand/Alger proposals in 1959 could thus have re-
' 50
 421 U.S. at 649 n.9 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See text at note 136 supra.
' 5 ' 421 U.S. at 634 & n.16.
152
 325 U.S. 821 (1945).
153 Id. at 822.
' 54 1d. at 823.
155 Id. The union refused to negotiate because during the strike one of the union
tnen was killed and a member of the petitioning freight hauling partnership was tried
for the homicide but acquitted. Id. at 822.
'se
	 at 823.
's 7 Id. at 824.
I"
 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), recognized that unilateral
union activity, enumerated in § 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970), and di-
rected against a secondary employer, was exempt from the Sherman Act. 312 U.S. at
232. Picketing was interpreted by the Hutcheson Court as one of the activities falling
within the scope of § 20. 1d. at 233.
15 ° See 421 U.S. at 640 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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suited in a continued antitrust exemption for hot cargo agreements.
On the other hand, had it so desired, Congress could have ex-
plicitly created an antitrust exemption in 1959 by providing that sec-
tion 303 was the exclusive remedy for section 8(e) violations, whether
the agreement was coerced, voluntary or conspiratorial in nature,'"
That it did not do so could mean that no exemption from the anti-
trust laws was intended. The Court, in its stress on the lack of an ex-
press amendment to section 303 and its attribution of no significance
to the rejection of the Hiestand/Alger legislation,'" appears to have
adopted this reasoning.
It is submitted that the 1947 and 1959 legislative histories com-
pel neither Justice Stewart's nor the Court's interpretation. When a
broad reading of Hunt is juxtaposed alongside this history, it appears
that Justice Stewart's interpretation is the stronger of the two.'"
Nonetheless, from a practical standpoint, Justice Stewart's interpreta-
tion is weaker. His contention—that the type of remedy available for
an illegal 8(e) agreement depends on whether the agreement is
coerced, voluntary or conspiratorial—is unpersuasive because it en-
courages coercion and provides inconsistent remedies. Under his
rationale, an injured third party would have an antitrust remedy only
where a union and a secondary employer intentionally, for the pur-
pose of restraining competition and injuring the third party, 163 en
-tered into an agreement prohibited by section 8(e).'" Thus, it en-
courages a union to use coercion to obtain the agreement rather than
'""lCiongress knows how to spell out an exemption from the antitrust law
when -it wants to do so, e.g., the CAB and the FMC, where the agencies
give consideration to antitrust policy but make the initial decisions them-
selves and in contrast to proceedings in the Federal Communications
Commission, where any action by the FCC is specifically open to antitrust
challenge.
Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
IfIL 421 U.S. at 634 n.16.
"" The Court may have discounted Hunt since its enunciation of the "natural ef-
fects" test seemingly has overruled that decision, which turned on the lack of a conspi-
racy, not the anticompetitive effects of the agreement See 325 U.S. at 824. By disting-
uishing among coerced, voluntary and conspiratorial but cargo agreements, Justice
Stewart may have rejected the Cow-i's antitrust exemption test without directly so stat-
ing. On the other hand, Justice Stewart may have meant only that regardless of the
status of the antitrust exemption today, at the time of the 1959 Amendments only con-
spiratorial hot cargo agreements were subject to the antitrust laws. In failing to ex-
pressly amend § 303, Congress recognized this distinction. Therefore, the distinction
presently must be honored.
"3
 The illegal purpose can be intended solely by the union acting to further the
anticompetitive interests of a non-signatory employer. For example, if the Union had
sought the illegal agreement from Connell solely as a means of furthering the desires of
the Dallas Mechanical Contractors Association to restrain trade among its competitors,
the requisite conspiracy would have been present.
I" According to Justice Stewart, only conspiratorial hot cargo agreements were
subject to antitrust liability after 1947. See text accompanying notes 134-36 supra.
Justice Stewart did nut reach the question of whether the Court's "natural effects" test
is appropriate under other circumstances.
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non-coercive persuasion, since coercion would ensure that only the
NLRA remedy provision would be triggered. Coercion would not be
encouraged if the union sought the agreement solely as a means of
expanding its membership; the injured party would then be unable to
prove a conspiracy to restrain trade, since no such conspiracy would
exist. In such a case, however, the injured party would be relegated to
the Board injunctive procedure under section 10(1), and a delayed
Board injunction procedure alone would not serve as a deterrent to il-
legal hot cargo agreements.
Relegating a party injured by a voluntary, non-conspiratorial
agreement to injunctive relief under section 10(1) is also an inade-
quate remedy. Only a party injured by a coerced agreement could get
damages, although the party injured by the voluntary agreement
would stiffer an identical injury. At the same time, Justice Stewart's
remedial scheme allows the party who can prove a conspiracy to col-
lect treble damages"' while the party injured by a coercively obtained
agreement can collect only actual damages.'" Thus, it provides incon-
sistent remedies for essentially identical injuries. However, if Justice
Stewart correctly perceived the antitrust status quo for hot cargo
agreements at the time of' the 1959 Amendments, Congress is the
source of this irrational result since Congress extended the NLRA
remedial scheme to displace antitrust liability for coerced hot cargo
agreements.
The Court's decision, on the other hand, provides a consistent
remedy whether the illegal hot cargo agreement is coerced, voluntary
or conspiratorial in nature. Furthermore, the Court's interpretation is
consistent with the line drawn between the statutory exemption for
unilateral union activities and the nonstatutory exemption for union-
employer agreements. Nonetheless, the Court's approach encourages
a non-labor party, subject to union coercion aimed at execution of an
illegal hot cargo agreement, to do as Connell did—sign the agreement
and bring an antitrust suit. In so doing, however, the non-labor party
is hamstrung. Since section 8(e) provides that any illegal agreement is
unenforcible and void, the signatory non-labor party would not be
required to comply with the agreement, and would thus seem not to
be injured by the agreement. Since demonstration of injury is a pre-
requisite to maintenance of a Sherman Act suit,' 67 it would be ques-
tionable whether the signatory non-labor party would be able to main-
tain an antitrust action. Indeed, unless Connell incurred damages by
complying with the district court's decision, it would appear that
Connell's only damages are those caused by the Union's picketing.
Clearly, however, Connell cannot recover those damages in its anti-
trust suit since they were not incurred as a result of any agreement in
'" 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
166 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970). See note 20 supra.
167 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) provides: "Any person who shall be injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
...." (emphasis added).
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restraint of trade and since the 1947 legislative history appears to
demonstrate a congressional intent to preclude an antitrust recovery
for secondary picketing.""
Thus, apart from general contractors who, prior to the Court's
decision, had entered into agreements similar to the Union-Connell
agreement, the only party to gain by the Court's decision would ap-
pear to he an injured third party. Section 10(1) allows the injured
party to obtain an injunction through the Board to prevent further
compliance with the agreement." ° 1 The NLRA does not, however,
allow the injured party to recover damages suffered as a result of an
express or implied illegal hot cargo agreement. The Court's recogni-
tion of a right in the injured third party to seek treble damages under
the Sherman Act therefore is a small but sure advance.
CONCLUSION
In resolving whether the Union-Connell agreement was entitled
to a nonstatutory antitrust exemption, the Supreme Court has inter-
jected needed clarity into this troublesome area of the law. A labor
union's nonstatutory antitrust exemption, in the absence of a conspi-
racy, is now to be determined by an inquiry into whether the an-
ticompetitive effects of the union-employer agreement are a natural
consequence of the union's legitimate interest in eliminating competi-
tion based on differences in wages, hours and working conditions.
However, the interpretation which the Court has placed on the con-
struction industry proviso to section 8(e) of the NLRA will have a sig-
nificant impact on labor in that industry. If indeed Congress intended
construction unions to utilize the proviso as a means of alleviating the
problems which attend a multiemployer construction site, the Court
has prevented full realization of this purpose by limiting the proviso's
scope to agreements entered into only within a collective bargaining
relationship. Moreover, this limitation fails to restrict the use of sub-
contracting agreements, authorized by the proviso, as "top-down" or-
ganizational weapons. Finally, this limitation eliminates what appears
to have been a prevalent role for Building and Construction Trades
Councils in the industry's pattern of collective bargaining. It is submit-
ted that if Congress intended the construction industry proviso to
protect union employees from having to work alongside non-union
workers on a multiemployer construction site, Congress must legisla-
tively overrule Connell. Moreover, although the Court's application of
antitrust remedies to hot cargo agreements, whether coerced, volun-
tary, or conspiratorial in nature, provides consistent remedies for
identical injuries, it is unclear from the legislative history that Con-
gress sought such a result. Thus, if Congress intended that only con-
spiratorial hot cargo agreements be subjected to the antitrust laws, it
168 See 421 U.S. at 645-46 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
149 29 U.S.C. g 160(0 (1970). See note 21 supra.
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must act to re-establish an antitrust exemption for coerced and volun-
tary hot cargo agreements.
ANN E. WEIGEL
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